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States entering into international agreements have at their disposal several tools to 
enhance the credibility of their commitments, including the ability to make the 
agreement a formal treaty rather than soft law, provide for mandatory dispute resolution 
procedures, and establish monitoring mechanisms.  Each of these strategies – referred to 
as “design elements” – increases the costs associated with the violation of an agreement 
and, therefore, the probability of compliance.  Yet even a passing familiarity with 
international agreements makes it clear that states routinely fail to include these design 
elements in their agreements. 
 
This Article explains why rational states sometimes prefer to design their agreements in 
such a way as to make them less credible and, therefore, more easily violated.  In contrast 
to domestic law, where contractual violations are sanctioned through zero-sum payments 
from the breaching party to the breached-against party, sanctions for violations of 
international agreements are not zero-sum.  To the extent sanctions exist, they almost 
always represent a net loss to the parties.  For example, a reputational loss felt by the 
violating party yields little or no offsetting benefit to its counter-party.   
 
When entering into an agreement, then, the parties take into account the possibility of a 
violation and recognize that if it takes place, the net loss to the parties will be larger if 
credibility enhancing design measures are in place.  In other words, the design elements 
offer a benefit in the form of greater compliance, but do so by increasing the cost of a 
violation and the net cost to the parties.  When deciding which design elements, if any, to 
include, the parties must balance the benefits of increased compliance against the costs 
triggered in the event of a violation.   
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States enter into international agreements all the time, and these agreements vary 
widely along several dimensions.
1 Some are formal treaties while others fall short of that 
classification, being labeled instead “soft law;”
2 some include dispute resolution procedures 
while others do not;
3 and some provide for sophisticated monitoring mechanisms that are 
absent from other agreements.
4 When states design their agreements they often make 
choices – like the choice of soft law or the decision to omit provisions for dispute resolution 
or monitoring – that serve to reduce the credibility of their commitments.
5 This behavior is 
puzzling.  International law provides few mechanisms through which to enforce 
commitments, so when states exchange promises it is often difficult to make those promises 
 
1 This Article offers an explanation for some, but not all of the diversity that exists in international 
agreements.  Some of the other sources of diversity within agreements are discussed in the fall 2001 
symposium issue of International Organization.  See Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, 
The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761 (2001); Barbara Koremenos, Charles 
Lipson, & Duncan Snidal, Rational Design: Looking Back to Move Forward, 55 INT’L ORG. 1051 (2001). 
2 For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the product of a formal 
treaty while the Basle Accord is not a treaty.  See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, (July 1998), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm; see generally, Lawrence Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening 
International Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998); Thomas Oatley & Robert Nabors, Redistributive 
Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord, 52 INT’L ORG. 1, 35-54 (1998).    
3 For example, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) typically include dispute resolution procedures, as 
does the WTO, whereas the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War does not.  
See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, 
U.S.-Arg., arts. II-V, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-2, at 3-6 (1993); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
4 For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides for the 
submission of reports by the parties when so requested by the Human Rights Committee (“the Committee”), 
and the Committee is authorized to review and comment on these reports.  See ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(1966), art. 40(1)(b), (4); see also Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols, Fire Alarms & the Review of Treaty 
Commitments, mimeo, * 2 (2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Police Patrols]. 
5 A soft law agreement reduces the credibility of the commitment relative to a treaty because it 
represents a lower level of commitment.  Omitting dispute resolution and monitoring procedures has a similar 
effect because these procedures serve to identify and publicize violations. 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art13Design of International Agreements 
1740-text.native.1082650451 
4/22/2004 9:13 AM 
2
credible.  Because the ability to make credible promises is valuable, one might expect states 
to do everything in their power to increase the credibility and “compliance pull” of their 
agreements. 
In the domestic context, for example, the parties to a contract typically want their 
written agreements to be enforceable.  This enforceability allows them to rely on one 
another’s promises and enter into a more profitable exchange.
6 States cannot write 
enforceable promises in the same way as private parties, but one would expect them to use 
the tools at their disposal to make their agreements more, rather than less, credible.  Yet 
states do not do so.  They routinely fail to design agreements to maximize the credibility of 
their promises.  They frequently enter into soft law agreements; most agreements, including 
treaties, do not include mandatory dispute resolution provisions;
7 and mechanisms for 
monitoring and review are often weak or non-existent.
8 Neither legal nor political science 
scholars have a theory to explain why states are so hesitant to use these credibility-
enhancing strategies.
9
6 This is a simple insight from contracts.  It is discussed in detail in Part II.A. 
7 See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002) [hereinafter Cost of Credibility].  Domestic contracts do not 
normally include dispute resolutions provisions either, but unlike international agreements they can rely on 
the background legal system for enforcement.  International contracts provide a better example of private 
parties seeking to ensure the credibility of their agreements.  These contracts typically include a choice of law 
clause and frequently an arbitration clause, which identifies the law that is to govern the dispute and the 
forum in which a dispute will be resolved. 
8 See Police Patrols, supra note 4.  Domestic contracts do not always provide for monitoring, but they 
tend to do so where monitoring is most important.  For example, secured creditors will normally include 
monitoring provisions of some sort in their credit agreements when the amount involved is large enough o 
justify the costs of monitoring. 
9 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, mimeo (2002) (stating 
that international lawyers “have produced few theories of why states chose to use or avoid legality”) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Form and Substance]; Cost of Credibility, supra note 7, at 307 (“The reluctance of 
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The central claim of this Article is that state resistance to such strategies is the 
product of tension between two objectives pursued by states when they enter into an 
agreement.
10  The first is the desire to make the agreement credible and binding.  This is 
analogous to the desire on the part of private parties to make their agreements enforceable.  
The design elements of hard law, dispute resolution, and monitoring all promote this goal.
11
The observation that each of these design elements promotes credibility and compliance 
yet is often not incorporated in an agreement is the heart of the puzzle addressed in this 
paper. 
The second part of the explanation is related to the sanctions triggered by the 
violation of an international agreement.  In the domestic context, a contractual breach is 
normally punished through monetary damages paid by the breaching party to the breached-
against party.  This is a zero-sum transfer in the sense that what is lost by one party is 
 
states to include binding dispute resolution clauses in their agreements has received limited attention from 
international law scholars.”).  But see Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism As A "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis Of 
The GATT "Escape Clause" With Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991) (offering a public 
choice explanation of the use of escape clause provisions article XIX of GATT). 
10 As this sentence makes clear, this Article embraces an institutionalist view.  It is worth noting that 
there is considerable debate about the proper way to model state behavior, and institutionalism is only one of 
the possible choices with the other common ones being realism and constructivism.  The merits and demerits 
of these approaches have been exhaustively catalogued, debated, and discussed elsewhere and it serves no 
purpose to revisit that debate here.  For discussions of these approaches, see Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern 
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE  J. INT’L L. 335 (1989) 
(institutionalism); Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE  L.J. 2599 (1997) 
(constructivism); Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996) (constructivism); 
THE PERILS OF ANARCHY: CONTEMPORARY REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Michael E. Brown, 
Sean M. Lynn-Jones, & Steven E. Miller eds., 1995) (realism).  
11 Throughout the paper the term “design elements” will be used to describe the credibility 
enhancing devices that represent the focus of the Article – hard law, dispute resolution, and monitoring. 
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gained by the other.
12  When agreements between states are violated, however, the 
associated sanctions do not have this zero-sum character.
13
When a state violates an international commitment it suffers, to the extent it faces 
any sanction, a loss of reputation in the eyes of other states, perhaps combined with some 
form of direct sanction.
14 These sanctions represent a loss to the state that has violated its 
obligation, but do not provide an offsetting gain to the party to whom the obligation was 
owed.  The sanction, therefore, is a net loss to the parties – one party faces a cost that is 
not recovered by the other.
15
When the parties enter into an agreement, they recognize the potential for this 
future loss and the fact that credibility-enhancing design elements serve to increase this net 
loss in the event of a violation.  The desire to increase the credibility of commitments, 
then, is tempered by a desire to avoid this net loss in the event of a violation.  It is the 
tension between these competing goals of credibility and loss avoidance that explains the 
fact that states use the design elements discussed in this Article – hard law, dispute 
resolution, monitoring – in some but not all international agreements. 
 
12 There are, of course, transaction costs including lawyers’ fees, but these are put to one side.  In 
many cases these fees will be modest and perhaps even zero because most disputes are settled prior to trial, 
and some are settled before lawyers are even hired. 
13 See infra note 33. 
14 See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823 
(2002) [hereinafter Compliance-Based Theory]. 
15 States could, of course, provide for money damages in their agreements.  In fact, they almost never 
do so.  The reasons for state resistance to money damages is itself something of a puzzle and this Article does 
not attempt to explain this fact.   It may be that money payments are not considered an effective deterrent, or 
that the political costs associated with either paying money damages or accepting them in compensation for a 
violation are significant.  Alternatively, there may be a sense among states that money damages would be 
ignored too easily.  Whatever the reason, this Article simply recognizes this fact and assumes that money 
damages are not available.  For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Part V.B. 
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The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II describes in detail why the failure of states 
to design their agreements in such a way as to maximize the credibility of their 
commitments is a puzzle, especially in light of what we know about the exchange of 
promises in the domestic setting.
16  Part III explains how the desire for greater credibility 
and compliance interacts with the fear of losses generated in the event of a violation.  Part 
IV presents the predictions yielded by the theory regarding the use of credibility-enhancing 
devices.  Part V explores some of the implications of the theory, including predictions 
about when credibility-enhancing devices are most likely.  Part VI concludes. 
II. THE PUZZLING DIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS 
When states enter into an international agreement, they have complete control 
over what is and is not included.  Among the decisions that must be made are: the choice 
between hard and soft law; the decision to include or exclude dispute resolution provisions; 
and the decision to include or exclude monitoring, reporting, and verification provisions.
17 
This Part explains why we would expect states to use these design elements to increase the 
credibility and effectiveness of international agreements, and shows that the failure of 
states to use them more often should be puzzling to international law scholars.  It also 
reviews and evaluates existing arguments advanced to explain why these elements are not 
used more often.  Some of these arguments have merit and the explanation advanced here 
 
16 Along the way, Part II considers existing explanations for the resistance to credibility-enhancing 
enhancing devices in international agreements, including some that rely on domestic political forces. 
17 The choice regarding dispute resolution and monitoring is, of course, not a binary one.  There are 
a wide variety of ways each of these design elements could be incorporated.  The Article frequently speaks of 
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is intended as a complement to these claims, not a substitute.  Other arguments advanced 
in the literature, however, have little to recommend them and should be dismissed. 
The first design element of interest to this Article is the soft law/hard law divide,
18 
which will be referred to as the choice of “form.”
19  When states enter into an agreement, 
they have the option of adopting either form.
20 If they evidence an intent to be “bound,” 
the agreement is labeled a treaty, and if they do not demonstrate such an intent, it is 
labeled “non-binding,” or soft law.
21  Though the precise place of soft law within the 
 
a choice to include or exclude such elements, but this should be recognized as a shorthand for the actual 
choice that includes not only whether or not to include the design elements, but how strong to make them. 
18 There is no single agreed-upon definition of soft law. One approach is to identify what soft law is 
not.  It is not “hard law” by which is meant treaties or custom, nor is it a purely political understanding 
without a legal component.  Rather, soft law is what lies between these two alternatives.  See Kenneth W. 
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
421, 422 (Summer 2000).  For more about "soft law," see Wellens & Borchardt, Soft Law in European 
Community Law, 14 EUR. L. REV. 267 (1989); Gunther F. Handl et al., A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 371 (1988); Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding “Soft Law," 30 
MCGILL L. J. 37 (1984).  The term “soft-law” is used herein to denote law that falls short of the classical 
definition of international law.  See Form and Substance, supra note 9 (describing the term soft law).  This is a 
common usage of the term, but it is not the only one.  Some use the term to describe rules that meet the 
classical definition but are imprecise of weak.  See Prosper Weil, Toward Relative Normativity in International 
Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 414 n.7 (1983) (“It would seem better to reserve the term ‘soft law’ for rules that 
are imprecise and not really compelling, since sublegal obligations are neither ‘soft law’ nor ‘hard law’: They 
are simply not law at all.”).  Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 420 (1991) [hereinafter International Law of the Environment]; Mary Ellen O’Connell, The 
Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 100, 109-10 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Christine Chinkin, The 
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850 (1989). 
19 In other writing I have commented on the conceptual problems that soft law presents for 
international legal scholars.  See Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 14, at 1878-83. 
20 See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge 2000). 
21 The terms “binding” and “non-binding” are sometimes used as synonyms for hard and soft law 
respectively but these terms are somewhat misleading because binding commitments – meaning treaties -- 
often do not include enforcement mechanisms of any kind, let alone the sort of coercive enforcement 
mechanisms that we are used to in domestic law.  Non-binding agreements, on the other hand, are commonly 
thought to affect the behavior of states and do so in part because they impose some sort of obligation on the 
signatories.  We cannot, therefore, distinguish these two categories of commitment based on whether there is 
a sanction for non-compliance or whether they affect state behavior.  If non-binding agreements affect 
behavior, a failure to comply must entail some consequences.  On the other hand, it is clear that violation of 
a binding agreement imposes only limited costs on states.  The most that can be said about the distinction 
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framework of international law is uncertain, it is clear that traditional international law 
scholarship considers soft law less “law” than the “hard law” of treaties and, for that matter, 
custom.
22  By this it is meant that soft law is less obligatory than hard law and, presumably, 
has less impact on behavior.
23  This Article accepts as given the conclusion that, all else 
equal, soft law impacts state behavior less than do treaties in the sense that a given set of 
substantive obligations is more likely to affect behavior if it takes the form of a formal 
treaty.
24 
But soft law is not the only design element that can affect the “compliance-pull” of 
an agreement.  States also choose whether or not to adopt formal dispute resolution 
 
between binding and non-binding agreements, then, is that a violation of the former will, all else equal, 
impose greater costs on the violating state than violation of the latter. 
22 Pieter van Dijk, Normative Force and Effectiveness of International Norms, 30 F.R.G. Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 
20 (1987).  Perhaps the most traditional position views agreements other than treaties as nothing more than 
evidence of custom.  See Dupuy, supra note 18, at 432.  Under another view, soft law “tends to blur the line 
between the law and the non-law, be that because merely aspirational norms are accorded legal status, albeit 
of a secondary nature; be that because the intended effect of its usage may be to undermine the status of 
established legal norms.” Handl, supra note 18, at 371. 
23 One additional clarification is needed here.  Some commentators use a definition of soft law that 
encompasses formal treaties whose substantive obligations are weak.  Thus, for example, a formal treaty that 
has no clear requirements but instead consists of a set of goals, aspirations, or promises to pursue certain 
general objectives would be considered “soft” under this taxonomy.  See R.R. Baxter, International Law in "Her 
Infinite Variety", 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 549, 554 (1980); Chinkin, supra note 18, at 851.  It is certainly true 
that the impact of an agreement is affected by both its form (binding versus non-binding) and by its 
substantive provisions.  That is, a formal treaty can certainly have its impact reduced is the substance of the 
agreement is watered down.  Furthermore, one could talk in general terms about a treaty being “strong” or 
“weak” based on how much pressure it puts on states to change their behavior, and this would depend on 
both the form and substance of the agreement.  All that said, it remains useful to distinguish between the 
impact of a choice of form and the impact of a change in the substance of a treaty.  For this reason, this 
Article will retain the terms binding and non-binding; as well as hard law and soft to refer to the formal legal 
status of an obligation.  Treaties will be referred to as binding or hard, other agreements as non-binding or 
soft.  This is done to clarify the discussion and dispute the fact that many binding agreements impact state 
behavior less than some non-binding agreements. 
24 This is assumed to be true even if the treaty has no monitoring, dispute resolution provisions, or 
other enforcement mechanisms.  Thus, it is the treaty form itself that increases the commitment, the costs of 
violation, and the likelihood of compliance. 
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processes.
25  These can range from a framework for consultation to a formal system of 
binding adjudication.
26 Though some high profile agreements such as the WTO
27 and the 
Law of the Sea Convention
28 include a mandatory dispute resolution mechanism, most do 
not provide procedures of that sort.
29  The conventional view of dispute resolution, and the 
one adopted in this Article, assumes that it increases the incentive toward compliance 
because it provides a mechanism to identify violations and may provide for some formal 
sanction.
30  The third design element that increases credibility is the use of monitoring 
procedures.  There are, of course, a wide range of ways to monitor compliance, ranging 
from self-reporting or occasional and informal statements of state conduct to formal 
inspections of state behavior and compliance by neutral observers.
31 
25 At various points this Article will refer to the decision to include or exclude dispute resolution 
provisions.  In fact, states face a range of options with regard to dispute resolution rather than a binary choice.  
When the Article refers to this choice, then, it should be taken to mean a choice among the full variety of 
possible strategies, ranging from little or no system to deal with dispute to a very structured and formal 
mandatory process. 
26 An example of the former can be found in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973), which provides for negotiations between disputing 
parties and which allows for arbitration of dispute, but only with the consent of both parties.  See id., at art. 
XVIII.  An example of the latter can be seen in bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  See, e.g., Treaty 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., arts. II-
V, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-2, at 3-6 (1993), 31 I.L.M. 124, 129-32; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT’LL. 621 (1993). 
27 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
28 See United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, art. 188. 
29 See Cost of Credibility, supra note 7, at 304. 
30 Dispute resolution may provide an additional benefit in that it serves to reduce the use of costly 
sanctions, especially when there has been no violation, because a finding that there has been no violation can 
prevent the unjustified use of such sanctions. 
31 See, e.g., supra note 4.  Kal Raustiala categorizes the different monitoring systems as either strong 
or weak.  His category of strong systems include “police patrols,” by which he means investigation and 
evaluation of behavior by a central authority, and “fire alarms,” by which he means a determination by a 
central authority based on self-reporting or claims by other parties.  See Police Patrols, supra note 4. 
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A. International Agreements as Contracts 
International agreements are, at root, an exchange of promises among states.  This 
is true whether they are full blown treaties or merely statements of intent; whether they 
require wholesale changes to domestic practices or merely reflect existing behavior; and 
whether or not they include provisions for enforcement.  Because our understanding of 
promises made at the international level is quite poor, there is much to be gained by 
looking to other areas of law where we have a better set of theoretical and conceptual tools 
with which to work.  In particular, scholarship on the law of contracts offers a sophisticated 
understanding of promises made in the domestic context.  It is, therefore, helpful to think 
of international agreements as a form of contract and bring to bear on the study of those 
agreements some of the insights from the contracts literature.  Of course, there are 
important differences between promises exchanged by states and those exchanged by 
private parties.  In fact, this Article points to one such difference to help explain why states 
often enter into agreements that are less binding than one might expect.  Nevertheless, 
analogy to contracts is useful because it offers a good starting point for the study of 
international agreements. 
Consider one of the most basic ideas from contract theory, the Coase theorem.
32  In 
the absence of transactions costs, the parties will negotiate an efficient contract, meaning 
 
32 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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one that generates the maximum possible joint surplus.
33  The terms of the contract will 
then provide for some distribution of that surplus.  In a contract between a buyer and a 
seller, for example, the seller will offer higher and higher quality up to the point where the 
buyer’s willingness to pay for higher quality is less than the cost of further quality increases.  
The ultimate sale will include a price adjustment to reflect this higher quality, though 
precisely how the gains generated by the contract are divided will vary based on the market 
power of the parties.  Notice that this interaction generates the optimal quality level – 
higher quality would not be worth the cost, lower quality would reduce the total benefit 
enjoyed by the parties by more than the cost savings. 
This simple theory of negotiation is well established in the contracts literature, but 
how does it affect the way in which we view inter-state agreements?  Before proceeding, we 
must make some assumptions about state behavior.  This Article assumes that states are 
rational beings; that they act in their own self-interest, at least as that interest is defined by 
the political leaders of the state; and that states are aware of the impact of their actions on 
the behavior of other states.  These represent standard assumptions about state conduct 
but our understanding of state behavior remains sufficiently contested that it is worthwhile 
to identify them explicitly.
34  The assumptions imply that when states enter into 
 
33 In discussions of international institutions the effort to maximize the total joint surplus of the 
parties to an agreement is sometimes referred to as “rational design.”  See Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, supra 
note 1, at 781. 
34 The assumptions made here are conventional institutionalist ones.  See Kenneth W. Abbott, 
Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335 (1989); 
ROBERT  O. KEOHANE, AFTER  HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD  POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 27 (1984).  Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and 
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Walter Carlsnaes et al., 2002).   
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international agreements they will, like domestic parties entering into a contract, seek to 
maximize the joint benefits to the parties.
35
With the above assumptions in mind, imagine two (or more) states engaged in 
negotiation over some set of issues.  For example, Mexico and the United States might be 
concerned about a set of environmental issues that affect both states.  The states may have 
different priorities and different goals, and each pursues its own interests without regard for 
the interests of the other.  Whatever they ultimately agree to, however, our assumption 
that they will reach an efficient agreement ensures that there is no alternative agreement 
that could make both parties better off.  Suppose, for instance, that the United States 
prefers tougher environmental standards than does Mexico.  If those standards are 
sufficiently important to the U.S., it will get the standards it wants in exchange for some 
other concession – perhaps better treatment for illegal immigrants within the United 
States.  Alternatively, if the cost to Mexico of higher standards is greater than what the 
U.S. is willing to pay, lower standards will prevail in the agreement because the 
compensation demanded by Mexico for its acceptance of higher standards would exceed 
the willingness to pay of the United States.  The parties will increase the level of agreed 
 
35 Notice that these assumptions about state behavior are consistent with both a public interest 
model of governance in which states pursue the welfare of their citizens, and an alternative public choice 
model in which governmental leaders pursue their own private goals.  See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: 
New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 900 (2002) (discussing how public choice issues can be handled in an 
international law context).  The most able scholar using public choice analysis in the international context is 
Alan Sykes.  See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure Of Renegotiation And Dispute 
Resolution In The World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 179 (2002); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. 
Sykes,  Toward A Positive Theory Of The Most Favored Nation Obligation And Its Exceptions In The 
WTO/GATT System, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 27 (1996); Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as A "Safeguard":  A 
Positive Analysis Of The GATT "Escape Clause" With Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991). 
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upon standards as long as the U.S. is willing to pay more than Mexico demands – leading 
them to an agreement that maximizes their joint welfare.  No other agreement could, when 
combined with some transfer payment, make both parties better off. 
The domestic contract law story ends at this point – it is assumed that, having 
reached an agreement that maximizes joint welfare, the parties will enter into a binding 
legal contract.
36 The contract would reflect the efficient bargain; disputes between the 
parties would typically be resolved by the domestic court system or, perhaps, some form of 
mandatory private arbitration; and monitoring would be provided for up to the point where 
the marginal benefit of additional monitoring is outweighed by its costs.  Entering into such 
a contract encourages both sides to uphold their end of the agreement, permits greater 
reliance by each party, and allows the parties to achieve the joint gains that motivated the 
contract in the first place.
37 
A glance at international agreements reveals that they appear inconsistent with the 
above description.
38  Specifically, agreements among states frequently do not make use of 
 
36 Domestic parties do occasionally enter into agreements that are not binding.  For example, in the 
course of the negotiation of a loan, two parties might sign a “letter of intent” which lays out the terms of the 
ultimate agreement but is not itself legally enforceable.  Agreements of this sort are often, though probably 
not always, intended to help the parties make sure that they have a common expectation about ongoing 
negotiations.  In any event, and whatever their purpose, it is clear that such agreements are atypical of 
domestic law agreements, and private contracting normally takes the form described in the text. 
37 See TAN 44. 
38 Variance in the use of credibility-enhancing devices is almost certainly related in part to the 
subject matter of the agreement.  For example, it is conventional wisdom that dispute resolution is more 
common in trade and human rights than in, for example, arms agreements.  See, e.g., James M. Smith, The 
Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts, 54 INT’L ORG. 137 (2000).  
Similarly, it is said that monitoring is more common in the environmental context.  See, e.g., Edith Brown 
Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International 
Environmental Accord 91 (2000).  This Article does not attempt to evaluate these empirical claims or to test 
the theory against them in a formal way.  Part IV, however, discusses when the theory predicts credibility-
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familiar and accessible mechanisms to increase the credibility of commitments.  States 
often enter into soft law agreements rather than treaties, typically fail to provide for any 
dispute resolution procedures,
39 and frequently require little or no monitoring or 
verification of performance.
40 
Before proceeding, it is important to recognize that all the design elements 
discussed in this Article are related.
41 Each of them alters the extent to which an 
agreement provides an incentive for states to comply.  Signing a treaty rather than soft law, 
including mandatory dispute resolution, and choosing to put monitoring procedures in 
place, all increase the impact of an agreement on state behavior.  Furthermore, it is possible 
to trade the compliance benefits of one of these elements off against those of another.  For 
example, a treaty that has stringent monitoring and reporting obligations but no dispute 
 
enhancing devices are most likely and offers some suggestive comments about how well these predictions 
accord with what we observe.  More formal testing of the theory is left for future work.  
39 And they almost never provide for dispute resolution procedures that attempt to impose 
something analogous to expectation damages. 
40 To illustrate the basic difference between what analogy to domestic contracting suggests and what 
we observe in the international context, consider how odd it would seem to see sophisticated business parties 
enter into negotiations, expend significant resources, produce a complex agreement, and then intentionally 
make that agreement non-binding and unenforceable.  Similarly, one would be surprised to see an agreement 
that is legally binding, but that declares itself unenforceable before any court or tribunal.  Indeed, the use of 
agreements that are intentionally not adjudicable before any body is so alien to conventional contract law 
that it is hard to even know what it means for a contract to be legally binding if there is no enforcement.  See 
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(3, 11) (defining “Contract" and “Agreement”).  Finally, a lawyer who 
negotiated a complex, long-term agreement and then failed to provide for the use of available and cost-
effective monitoring procedures would be criticized for an error of judgment.  Not only do all of these things 
happen in the world of inter-state agreements, they represent standard operating procedure.  
41 I am not the first to make this observation.  In a recent draft article, Kal Raustiala has observed 
the choice of form (i.e., treaty v. soft law) can be traded off against the substance of an agreement.  See Form 
and Substance, supra note 9, at *34. 
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resolution procedures might have the same impact on behavior as an agreement with 
limited monitoring and reporting but a mandatory dispute resolution procedure.
42
That there is a trade-off among these elements, however, does not explain state 
behavior because from a contracting perspective, one would expect states to use each of 
the elements to increase the credibility of their commitments.
43 Like the parties to a 
domestic contract, states wish to maximize the joint benefits from an agreement.   
Consistent with that desire, the parties will adopt enforcement techniques that ensure 
performance unless the total joint cost of performance is greater than the total joint 
benefit.  Specifically, they want to provide an incentive to perform, even if it turns out that 
performance is costly to one of the parties, as long as performance yields net benefits to the 
parties taken together.  In domestic contracts, of course, the law attempts to provide a 
system of damages and other remedies that leads to efficient results.  It is for this reason 
that expectation damages represent the standard remedy for contract violation – they 
encourage efficient breach.
44 
42 See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEG. STUD.
307, 352-354 (1994) (explaining the relationship between increased accuracy and costly sanctions in the 
domestic context). 
43 As already discussed, see supra TAN 35-37, contract theory tells us that states should increase the 
level of commitment up to the point at which the costs of violation are equal to the benefits thereof.  If some 
combination of design elements generates excessive commitment states would provide for some lower level of 
commitment.  In the international arena, however, it is hard to believe that any combination in the design 
elements can generates optimal, let alone excessive disincentives to a violation. 
44 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 117-26 (4th ed. 1992); John H. 
Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 283-89 (1972); Steven 
Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980).  But see Daniel Friedmann, 
The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1989) (challenging the claim that expectation damages yield 
an efficient outcome).  In domestic law there are other efficiency goals – specifically efficient insurance and 
efficient precaution – that may lead one to favor less than expectation damages.  These objectives, however, 
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The standard enforcement tools of international law are, of course, a great deal 
weaker than those present in domestic systems.  In particular, states cannot rely on a 
system of coercive enforcement to ensure an efficient level of damages.
45  The enforcement 
mechanisms are sufficiently weak that, as far as I am aware, no commentator argues that 
enforcement measures in international law are sufficient to secure optimal levels of 
compliance.
46
Given the weakness of the international enforcement system, one might expect, 
that international agreements would include mechanisms designed to heighten compliance.  
In fact, such mechanisms are not routinely included in agreements, and sanctions are 
normally not provided for.  Where sanctions are provided, they are often not severe, and 
often only prospective.
47  Simply put, in many agreements, the tangible sanctions for a 
failure to comply with international law are very weak.  Though there may also be a 
 
have less applicability to inter-state agreements and, in any case, the level of damages provided by the 
background rules of international law seem too low even if these other goals are taken into account. 
45 See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 269 
RECUEIL DES COURS 19 (1997) (“A fundamental (and frequent) criticism of international law is the weakness 
of mechanisms for enforcement.”); Richard Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law 
– Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REV. 231, 249 (1964) (“Among the most serious deficiencies in 
international law is the frequent absence of an assured procedure for the identification of a violation.”); 
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AMER. J. INT’L L. 705, 705 (observing “[t]he 
surprising thing about international law is that nations ever obey its strictures” because “the international 
system is organized in a voluntarist fashion, supported by so little coercive authority”). 
46  But see Lori Fisler Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 269 
RECUEIL DES COURS 19-22 (1997) (arguing that there are more sanctions for violation of international law 
than is generally recognized). 
47 See, e.g., The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. 22(4) (“The level of the suspension of 
concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or 
impairment.”). 
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reputational sanction,
48 there is no reason to think that reputation is sufficient to provide 
for an efficient level of breach between states.  Reputational sanctions are limited in 
magnitude and can be unpredictable, and even a total loss of reputation may not be enough 
to deter a violation of international law.
49  Reputational sanctions are also likely to under-
deter breach because the actions of the parties may not be observable to third parties.  In 
the absence of a disinterested adjudicator, the breached-against party cannot credibly 
demonstrate that the other party was at fault. 
Before proceeding it is worth pausing to address a potential objection.  It might be 
said that a rule of customary international law imposes on a violating state the obligation to 
“make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”
50  If one 
has sufficient belief in the power of customary international law one might ask if states rely 
on this background rule and, therefore, do not find it necessary to provide for damages in 
their agreements.  Analogizing to the domestic sphere, the argument would be that private 
parties relying on the default remedies of contract law may not feel it necessary to include a 
liquidated damage clause of other contractual language governing damages. 
A realistic appraisal of both the power of customary international law and the status 
of this particular rule, however, makes it clear that this claim is implausible.  First, it does 
not seem to be the case that a rule requiring reparation in the event of a violation of 
 
48  See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy 105-108 (1984); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984); Compliance-Based Theory,
supra note 14. 
49 See George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. 
LEG. STUD. 95 (2002) (discussing reputation as it affects international law). 
50 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 31. 
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international law.  The determination of what is and what is not customary international 
law is, of course, contentious, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt a 
comprehensive analysis of the question in this context.
51  It is enough to note that we do 
not witness a consistent pattern of reparations being paid between states when 
international obligations are violated.   
Furthermore, the draft articles are only relevant when states have chosen to enter 
into a hard law agreement and include a dispute resolution mechanism.  The hard law form 
is necessary because if there is rule of customary international law it only appears to bind 
states in the event of a violation of hard law obligations.  Even the Draft Article of State 
Responsibility do not claim that the reparations obligation applies to soft law.
52  States, 
therefore, could only consider the reparations obligation relevant in instances in which 
they select the hard law form.  If anything this depends the puzzle addressed in the Article 
since a customary international law requiring reparation would make hard law even more 
powerful and effective relative to soft law. 
 
51 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1113 (1999); Edward Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002).  
52 The Draft Articles state that the obligation to make full reparation is triggered by an 
“internationally wrongful act.”  See Draft Articles, art. 31(1).  The term “internationally wrongful act” is 
defined in relevant part in Article 2 as an act or omission that “[c]onstitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of the State.”  See id., at art. 2(b).  The commentary to the Draft articles explains that the phrase 
“international obligation” is used because it corresponds to the language of article 36(2)(c) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court can have jurisdiction over legal disputes 
concerning “the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation.”  Statute of ICJ, art. 36(2)(c).  Article 38 of the same statute, of course, state that the Court will 
apply international conventions, international custom, general principles of law, and judicial decisions and 
teachings of highly qualified publicists.  Id., at art. 38(1).  As the ICJ is not charged with taking soft law into 
account, and as the Draft Articles relate to the same jurisdictional universe as the ICJ, it follows that the 
draft articles do not apply to disputes over soft law.  See Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 2 ¶ 7.   
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Similarly, if this obligation were thought to be both effective and desirable we would 
expect more rather than less use of dispute resolution since the obligation to make 
reparation requires some authority to determine whether or not there has been a violation.  
And where states have determined that they do not want to provide for dispute resolution 
we would expect to see them routinely opting out of this obligation to make reparations. 
This is so because whatever concerns states about dispute resolution (e.g., fear of losing a 
case, fear of being perceived to be in violation of the law) should concern them about the 
reparation obligation.  For example, a state making a reparation payment is also admitting 
guilt, so if states avoid dispute resolution because they do not want to be declared to have 
violated international law one would also expect them to avoid the reparations obligation.   
Even if one were to accept, contrary to the practice of states, the claim that there 
exists a customary international law rule requiring the payment of reparation in response to 
a violation of international law, this rule could only serve as a substitute for credibility 
enhancing devices if it is equally effective.  Again, this is not the place for a complete 
discussion of the problems with customary international law, but it is clear that it is at best 
a weak force acting on states.  As such, it is hard to believe that it offers a substitute to the 
credibility enhancing devices discussed herein. 
Finally, even if one believes that a rule of customary law exists, and that it is 
effective, the compensation it calls for is often quite modest.  For example, a state that 
violates international law “is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused 
by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation.  Satisfaction 
may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology 
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or another appropriate modality.”
53  This form of “reparation” hardly seems sufficient to 
explain why states avoid the credibility enhancing devices discussed in this Article. 
B. Existing Explanations 
1. Explanations for the Presence of Soft Law
54
This Article is not the first to ask why states use soft law, and there are a number of 
existing explanations for why states enter into soft law agreements.
55 The two most salient 
– flexibility and domestic issues – are presented below.  The flexibility argument is largely 
unconvincing but the claims about domestic politics are surely an important part of the 
explanation for soft law. 
a) Flexibility 
The basic flexibility argument is that “[s]oft legalization allows states to adapt their 
commitments to their particular situations rather than trying to accommodate divergent 
national circumstances within a single text.  This provides for flexibility in 
 
53 Draft Articles, art. 37. 
54 There is a significant literature on the subject to of soft law.  See sources cited supra note 18.  The 
general view of soft law in international law is that it is in some sense less “binding” than traditional sources 
of international law, and states are accordingly less likely to comply.  Pieter van Dijk, Normative Force and 
Effectiveness of International Norms, 30 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 20 (1987).  Perhaps the most traditional 
position views agreements other than treaties as nothing more than evidence of custom.  See International Law 
of the Environment, supra note 18, at 432; Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-
Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 340 (2002) (“[M]ost public 
international lawyers, realists, and positivists consider soft law to be inconsequential.”). 
55 See Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’LL. 499 (1999); Charles Lipson, 
Why are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT’L ORG. 495, 500 (1991); Abbott & Snidal, supra note 
18; Gruchalla-Wesierski, supra note 18; Form and Substance, supra note 18. 
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implementation.”
56  In simple terms, states choose soft law because it is less binding on 
them and, therefore, gives them greater flexibility.
57 This flexibility is said to be desirable 
for a variety of reasons, including to help states deal with an uncertain world,
58 to reduce 
the costs of termination or abandonment,
59 or to make renegotiation easier.
60 
The merit of flexibility, then, turns on the fact that soft law is less binding on states, 
allowing them to respond to unexpected future events.  The problem with the argument is 
that flexibility of this sort reduces the value of the agreement to the parties.  When 
entering into the agreement states have an incentive to set terms that maximize the 
expected payoff from that agreement.  Granting each party the ability to unilaterally 
change those terms reduces this expected payoff.  Though a state prefers that its own 
commitments be “flexible” in this way, it would prefer that its counter-party be held to its 
 
56 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 18, at 445; Lipson, supra note 55, at 500 (“[I]nformal bargains are 
more flexible than treaties.  They are willows not oaks.”). 
57 To the extent the argument here is that it may at times be desirable to have weaker or less precise 
substantive provisions in an agreement, it is a question of what in this Article is defined as the “substance” of 
the agreement, and is discussed in Part III.F.  This Article uses a definition of “soft law” that turns entirely on 
questions of form – an agreement is soft if it is not a formal treaty.  Given this definition, there is no a priori 
reason why soft law instruments (meaning instruments that fall short of formal treaty status) must be less 
precise.  States could negotiate a detailed set of terms but have that exchange of promises take the form of 
soft law.  Similarly, states can enter into formal treaty commitments that lack precision.  Other scholars, in 
particular Abbott and Snidal, who are quoted above, see supra TAN 56, use a different definition of soft law.  
As a result, some arguments made by other authors about “soft law” may in fact be referring to characteristics 
of agreements (such as the precision of the substantive obligations) that are defined in differently in this 
Article. 
58 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 18, at 441 (stating that soft law helps states to deal with the fact 
that “[t]he underlying problems may not be well understood, so states cannot anticipate all possible 
consequences of a legalized arrangement”); Lipson, supra note 55, at 518 (arguing that soft law “is useful if 
there is considerable uncertainty about the distribution of future benefits under a particular agreement”); 
Form and Substance, supra note 9, at 18 (“governments need not predict the future and can easily adjust the 
agreement or renege”). 
59 See Lipson, supra note 55, at 518. 
60 See Abbott and Snidal, supra note 18, at 435. 
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promise.  In conventional contract language, an efficient treaty compels performance 
unless the joint costs of performance exceed the joint benefits.
61
b)  Domestic Law and Politics 
A different explanation for the use of soft law instruments concerns the domestic 
processes by which international agreements are approved.  The use of a soft law 
instrument rather than a treaty triggers a different set of domestic practices and this may 
affect the choice of form.  These arguments, whatever the merits of any particular claim, 
are surely part of the explanation for the use of soft law.  This section simply mentions 
three prominent explanations for soft law that turn on matters of domestic law and 
politics.
62 
Soft law agreements differ from treaties in that they do not require formal 
ratification and, therefore, can be implemented more quickly.
63  They also lie more 
completely within the domain of the executive branch of government.
64  These traits may 
 
61 Some of the specific arguments about the merits of flexibility have additional problems.  The 
claims that soft law is desirable because it makes renegotiation or termination easier seem wrong on their 
face, except inasmuch as they relate to matters of domestic politics, as discussed in Part II.B.1.b).  When 
negotiating an agreement, the parties remain free to include any termination provisions and renegotiation 
they wish, and can do so independently of the choice of form.  They could, for example, provide for 
termination without notice, or with short notice, or on whatever conditions they choose.  Similarly, the 
parties can provide any amendment provisions they wish, regardless of the form of the agreement.  For 
example, the UN Charter can be amended “by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly 
and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the 
United Nations, including all permanent members of the Security Council.”  See United Nations Charter, art. 
108.  To the extent that soft law agreements are easier to renegotiate, it is because of the domestic law issues 
discussed in II.B.1.b). 
62 This section is only intended to offer a glimpse and the domestic law arguments.  It is not intended 
to be comprehensive.  For more on the subject see Abbott & Snidal, supra note 18; Lipson, supra note 55. 
63 Lipson, supra note 55, at 500. 
64 See Lipson, supra note 55, at 516 (“It is plain . . . that executives prefer instruments that they can 
control unambiguously, without legislative advice or consent.”). 
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cause soft law instruments to be used when speed is important or when legislative support is 
lacking or uncertain.  Soft law also differs from treaties in that the treaties serve to “commit 
[different] domestic agencies (especially legislatures) or political groups when those officials 
are able to make international agreements with little interference or control.”
65  Thus, an 
executive that wants to enter into an agreement can use treaties to more effectively bind 
these other actors.  Finally, the choice between a treaty and soft law is also likely to be 
influenced by domestic political interests.  International agreements reflect, among other 
things, the demands of domestic groups.  When interest groups pressure a government to 
enter into negotiations, they typically want a treaty rather than soft law.
66 This is what we 
would expect from a contractual perspective – those who push for an international 
agreement want it to be in the most credible and binding form possible.  There is, of course, 
no guaranty that interest groups pushing for a treaty will get what they want.  Governments 
entering into the agreement may decide to enter into a soft law agreement for any number 
of reasons, including the fact that other interest groups may oppose a treaty.  The point 
here is that the political balancing of political interests may cause a state to enter into a soft 
law agreement as a form of compromise between groups seeking a treaty and those seeking 
to avoid any commitment. 
 
65 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 18, at 430. 
66 See Form and Substance, supra note 9, at *28 (“[M]any domestic and transnational interest groups 
focus on bindingness – on contractual form – as a necessary factor in international cooperation.”). 
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2. Explanations for the Rarity of Dispute Resolution
A small number of writers have commented on the reluctance of states to enter into 
dispute resolution procedures,
67 but they have failed to advance a convincing explanation 
for this behavior.  Two main arguments have been advanced.   
The first proposed explanation turns on the desire of states to retain control over 
disputes.  When a dispute arises, the argument goes, states prefer to resolve the dispute 
through bargaining and diplomacy rather than third party adjudication.
68  Though this 
argument may explain why states do not refer cases to third party tribunals after disputes 
arises, it does not shed light on the question of why dispute resolution is not included in 
agreements when they are signed.
69  The presence of dispute resolution, even if it is 
mandatory, does not prevent negotiation between the parties.  Until one of the parties 
turns to the dispute resolution procedures and, indeed, even after the formal mechanism of 
dispute settlement has been put into motion, the parties are able to discuss the dispute and 
enter into any settlement they choose.  The idea that dispute settlement procedures 
 
67  See Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, *4, 
mimeo (2001) (“States are particularly unwilling to enter into broad commitments to adjudicate future 
disputes, the content and contours of which cannot be foreseen.”) (on file with author); Arthur W. Rovine, 
The National Interest and the World Court, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 462-
73 (Leo Gross ed. 1976); J.G. MERILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (3d ed. 1998). 
68 “It is one thing to show that resort to the [International Court of Justice] is preferable to armed 
conflict; it is quite another matter to demonstrate that judicial processes are as valuable as ordinary out-of-
court bargaining and discussion.”  Rovine, supra note 67, at 314.  “[T]here is a more fundamental reluctance 
to submit to third-party adjudication that rests on the perceived advantages to States in some circumstances 
of retaining control over the resolution of disputes.”  Morris, supra note 67, at 17 (citing Rovine, supra note 
67.) 
69 Because commentators attempting to explain the absence of dispute resolution provisions 
frequently fail to distinguish the inclusion of mandatory provisions in an agreement and the decision to 
submit disputes to third party arbitration at the time of the dispute, it is impossible to know if they seek to 
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somehow prevent diplomatic negotiation is simply wrong.  It may affect the outcome of the 
negotiation because it changes the consequences of a refusal to settle, but it does not 
prevent the negotiation itself. 
A second explanation sometimes advanced for the refusal to adopt dispute 
resolution clauses relies on the notion that states are afraid of losing a case.
70 Without a 
larger theory of state behavior it is hard to know why a state’s fear of losing a case would 
outweigh its interest in winning a case.  The most likely explanation for such behavior is 
risk aversion on the part of states.
71 Risk aversion, however, is an unsatisfactory 
explanation for the choice of soft law for at least two reasons.   
First, states enter into many agreements and interact with other states on a regular 
basis.  Because each individual commitment represents only a small fraction of the total set 
of interactions, it is hard to see why risk aversion would be a sensible strategy for most 
agreements.
72  It would make more sense to maximize the expected value of each 
agreement and rely on the large number of agreements to diversify the total benefits to the 
state.  Second, the use of a dispute resolution clause may, in fact, reduce the level of risk.  
 
explain only the latter, in which case the arguments advanced seem right but the question asked is of less 
interest to this Article; or if they hope to explain the former, in which case the arguments are flawed. 
70 “Most obviously, but most fundamentally, states resist judicial settlement because they fear losing.”  
Rovine, supra note 67, at 317.   
71 “[T]he more uncertain the adjudicated outcome of a particular dispute would be, the less willing a 
State will be to seek binding third-party adjudication.”  Morris, supra note 67, at *8; Merrills, supra note 67, 
at 293-94 (“when the result is all important, adjudication is unlikely to be used because it is simply too 
risky.”). 
72 The risk aversion explanation even fails for agreements that are central to the existence or welfare 
of a state.  Even under the most credible of international agreements the consequences of a violation are 
quite limited.  There is no authority to compel compliance, so the harm from losing a dispute before a dispute 
settlement body is limited to the lesser of the costs of compliance and the costs of ignoring the decision of 
that body.    
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Such a clause increases the probability of compliance which, depending on range of future 
states of the world, may reduce the overall risk of the agreement.
73
3. Explanations for the Rarity of Monitoring Strategies
There is only a small literature on monitoring and review mechanisms,
74 and 
virtually no discussion of why these mechanisms exist in some agreements but not in 
others.
75  There does not appear to be any available explanation of why states do not use 
monitoring mechanisms more often to increase the credibility of their promises and why 
the mechanisms used are often weak.
76 
III. SEEKING CREDIBILITY, AVOIDING COMMITMENT 
A. Sanctions for Violations of International Law 
The explanation for why states do not make more use of credibility-enhancing 
devices relies on the unique way in which state violations of law are sanctioned in the 
 
73 It is also worth noting that there are a number of alternative ways to deal with the risk of an 
agreement.  States could, for example, build in escape clauses triggered by poor economic performance, other 
national crises, or other contingencies that concern the parties.  This strategy reduces the exposure to risk 
without reducing the agreement’s effectiveness in those states of the world in which the parties want 
compliance.  An alternative strategy would be to weaken the substantive requirements of the agreement.  
This reduces the benefits of the agreement, but also reduces the level of commitment.  Taken together, this 
may generate a higher expected return to the parties than an agreement with greater substantive provisions.  
Each of these strategies provides flexibility to the parties in a more nuanced and targeted way than simply 
including or excluding a dispute resolution provision. 
74  See Police Patrols, supra note 4; Kal Raustiala, Review of Institutions in Ten Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, in UN Environment Programme (forthcoming, 2002). 
75 See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1841 
(2002) (pointing out that even with the single field of human rights there is considerable diversity in human 
rights monitoring mechanisms). 
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international arena.  In a typical domestic contracts case between private parties, a 
contractual violation gives the aggrieved party the right to damages from the violating 
party.  These damages normally take the form of a cash transfer from one party to the 
other.  Because the penalty is a transfer, it has no impact on the joint welfare of the parties 
– what is lost by one party is gained by the other.  For this reason, when private parties 
enter into a contract the fact that damage payments may have to be paid in the future does 
not affect the expected benefits of the contract.
77 
In the international arena, however, the de facto consequences of a violation are 
quite different.  When an agreement is violated the offending state rarely pays money 
damages to other states.  In fact, violations are normally not compensated in any direct 
fashion.
78  One can think of examples in which a form of compensation is provided, but 
even these examples rarely represent the sort of zero-sum transfer that exists in the 
domestic case.  For instance, the WTO’s dispute resolution procedures have provisions for 
the suspension of concessions previously granted to a violating party.
79  Rather than being a 
zero-sum transfer, the suspension of concessions is costly for both the sanctioning and 
sanctioned party.
80  Furthermore, a party is permitted to impose sanctions only up to the 
 
76 See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, forthcoming, 51 
BUFF. L.R. *47 (2003) (observing the most international environmental agreements that include a 
monitoring system rely on self-reporting by states). 
77 What is meant here is that the actual transfer of funds from one party to the other does not itself 
affect the value of the contract.  The level of damages may, of course, affect the behavior of the parties and 
this, in turn, may affect the value of the agreement.   
78 See supra note 15. 
79 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute (DSU), art. 22. 
80 With a public choice perspective it is possible that the sanctions are zero sum, as discussed infra 
Part III.E.  
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point where the cost imposed on the violating party equals the ongoing costs of the 
violation, and the sanctions must stop when the violative measure is ended.
81 There is no 
compensation for past violations.
82 
That violations are not penalized through a transfer of money or other assets from 
the violating party to the aggrieved state, however, does not mean that they are not 
penalized at all.  If international law matters at all, it is because there is some sanction for 
its violation.
83  There are two primary ways in which a state can suffer harm as a result of its 
violation of international law: direct sanctions and reputational sanctions.
84 Direct 
sanctions are those imposed by other states against a violating state because it violated the 
agreement.  They are explicit punishments for the violation.  Direct sanctions are 
important to some international agreements,
85 but most agreements do not provide for 
explicit sanctions of this sort.
86  This leaves reputation as an important factor in the 
compliance decision of states. 
A state that violates an international commitment signals to other states that it 
does not take its international promises seriously and that it is willing to ignore its 
obligations.  When that state seeks to enter into agreements in the future, its potential 
 
81 Id., at art. 22(4). 
82 See id.
83 Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 14. 
84 See id., supra note 14 for a detailed discussion of why states comply with international law and the 
impact of both direct and reputational sanctions. 
85 For example, bilateral investment treaties provide for direct sanctions in the form of compensation 
to investors who have been mistreated by a host state.  See Andrew T. Guzman, Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (1998); Patricia 
McKinstry Robin, The BIT won’t Bite: The American Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme, 33 AM. U.L. REV.
931 (1984); RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGARETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 97-117 (1995). 
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partners will take into account the risk that the agreement will be violated, and will be less 
willing to offer concessions of their own in exchange for promises from that country.  If 
there is enough suspicion, potential partners may simply refuse to deal with the state.  A 
violation of international commitments, then, imposes a reputational cost that is felt when 
future agreements are sought.  A state known to honor its agreements even when doing so 
imposes costs can extract more for its promises than a state known to violate agreements 
easily.  When making a promise, a state pledges its reputation as a form of collateral.  A 
state with a better reputation has more valuable collateral and, therefore, can extract more 
in exchange for its own promises. 
B. The Impact of Costly Sanctions 
The key to explaining why states so frequently avoid credibility enhancing devices is 
that the sanction for a violation of international law is costly to the parties.
87  That is, 
reputational loses felt by one party are not captured by the other party to the agreement.  
Imagine, for example, that the United States and Russia enter into an arms agreement 
under which both parties agree to reduce their stockpile of nuclear weapons.  If Russia 
subsequently violates the agreement, countries around the world will observe that violation 
and Russia will suffer a reputational loss as a result.  This loss is not captured by the United 
 
86 See Cost of Credibility, supra note 7, at 304 & n.3 (observing that of 100 treaties surveyed only 20 
included dispute resolution provisions, and of those, 12 were BITs). 
87 The theory of costly sanctions and their use in the domestic context is laid out in Steven Shavell, 
Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985); 
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89 
(1984); Louis Kaplow, A Note on the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions, 42 J. PUB. ECON. 245 (1990).  
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States.
88  When the agreement is violated, then, one party suffers a loss but the other party 
does not enjoy an offsetting gain.
89
Now, consider once again the decision of the parties when they enter into an 
agreement.  To keep the analysis simple, suppose they must choose between a treaty and a 
“non-binding accord.”  The difference between these instruments is that the treaty is more 
likely to induce compliance – this is why treaties are considered the most effective 
instrument of cooperation.
90  A treaty, however, is a double-edged sword.  If there is a 
compliance benefit, it must be that a violation of the treaty imposes greater costs than a 
violation of the accord – that is, the reputational and direct harms associated with a 
violation must be greater for a treaty.  When choosing between a treaty and a soft law 
instrument, then, the parties face a trade-off.  A treaty generates higher levels of 
compliance, which (assuming the parties select terms optimally) increases the joint payoff, 
but in the event of a violation it imposes a larger penalty on the violating state.   
To see how this trade-off operates as the parties design their agreement, notice that 
there are three categories of outcomes relevant to the choice between soft and hard law.  
The first category includes those states of the world in which the parties to the agreement 
 
The theory developed here is related to these earlier paper, though I am not aware of any previous work 
applying these ideas in the international context. 
88 The United States may benefit from its now more accurate estimate of Russia’s willingness to 
comply, but this represents only a small fraction of the harm suffered by Russia whose reputation is harmed 
worldwide.  This example is given in the context of a bilateral agreement.  In the case of multilateral 
agreements a similar but more complex reasoning applies.  See Cost of Credibility, supra note 7, at 319-20. 
89 Similar reputational effects may be at work in domestic law, but the presence of zero-sum damages 
create a separate incentive to enter into contracts with efficient terms.  Furthermore, the role of reputation is 
diminished in the domestic environment because credibility is provided by the legal system – parties do not 
have to rely as heavily on their reputations when they wish to enter into agreements. 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art13Design of International Agreements 
1740-text.native.1082650451 
4/22/2004 9:13 AM 
30
will comply whether or not the agreement includes design elements intended to enhance 
the credibility of the commitments.  That is, international law provides sufficient incentives 
even if a soft law agreement is chosen.  In this category, the parties are neither better nor 
worse off if they opt for a formal treaty over a soft law agreement.
91 
The second category consists of all circumstances in which there would be 
compliance if a treaty is chosen, but violation otherwise.  This is the category of all cases in 
which the increased compliance pull of the treaty made the difference between compliance 
and violation.  Because compliance is preferred to violation, the parties are better off in this 
category if they chose a formal treaty. 
The third and final category of cases includes those in which there is a violation 
even if a formal treaty is used.  In these states of the world the use of a formal treaty would 
impose a larger reputational cost on the parties than would be the case if they chose a soft 
law agreement.  There is no compliance benefit to offset this cost, so in these cases the 
parties are better off with a soft law agreement. 
In deciding between hard and soft law, then, the states face a tradeoff between the 
second and third categories above.  In the former the use of hard law increases cooperation 
and gains to the states but in the latter hard law brings net costs.  To maximize the total 
value of the agreement the states must balance these concerns. 
 
90 See Lipson, supra note 55, at 508 (“The effect of treaties, then, is to raise the political costs of 
noncompliance.”). 
91 If the choice of hard law implies some additional costs such as ratification costs, then the parties 
would do better if they chose soft law.  
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C. The Optimal Agreement 
This section considers what the above theory predicts about the design of 
agreements among states.
92  We begin with the assumption that the parties to an agreement 
are able to anticipate and provide for every possible contingency.  We also assume that a 
dispute resolution authority is available (or can be created) and that this authority has 
perfect information about both the agreement and the facts of the dispute.  Though 
thoroughly artificial, these assumptions help to explain how agreements are affected by the 
fact that only costly sanctions are available.  The assumptions are then relaxed to generate 
a more realistic picture of international agreements. 
Under these extreme assumptions we expect the parties to tailor the agreement to 
the three outcome categories described in the previous section.
93  First, any behavior with 
total benefits that outweigh its costs will be permitted under the agreement.  This set of 
substantive obligations maximizes the total value of the agreement.  Second, harmful 
behavior that cannot be deterred be any available sanction will be permitted.  Because 
sanctions are costly to the parties, providing for them when the behavior cannot be 
prevented would only increase the harm resulting from that behavior.
94  Finally, behavior 
that is harmful and that can be deterred will be prohibited under the agreement and will be 
subject to dispute resolution procedures.  As part of the effort to deter this behavior, the 
 
92 The discussion here draws on Shavell, supra note 87, at 1241-46. 
93 See TAN 91. 
94 If for example, under certain circumstances a state (or its leaders) stands to gain so much by 
abrogating an environmental treaty that it will do so even if all available credibility enhancing devices are in 
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parties are likely to enter into a formal treaty with dispute resolution provisions and 
monitoring.
95 Because the behavior can be deterred, of course, no violation will ever take 
place. 
So if the parties could craft a complete agreement they would prohibit only 
behavior that is harmful and that could be deterred.  The agreement would be optimal in 
the sense that it would generate as much desirable cooperation as possible without ever 
actually imposing the costly sanction.
96 
States cannot, of course, enter into agreements that provide for every possible 
contingency, so we must relax the above assumptions.  It is clear that states cannot identify 
every behavior that they would like to prevent because they cannot anticipate every 
circumstance.  Thus, for example, the parties to a trade agreement might wish to permit 
the use of safeguard measures when domestic industries are threatened, but it may be 
impossible to verify when that is the case.
97  The agreement, then, is likely to permit some 
safeguard measures the parties would prefer to prohibit and to prohibit some measures the 
parties would like to have permitted.   
With respect to deterrence the parties to the agreement will be unable to perfectly 
identify behavior that can or that cannot be deterred.  In particular, some conduct that 
 
place, then the higher sanctions brought on by these devices represent a cost to the parties with no offsetting 
gain. 
95 It may be possible to deter the behavior without using all of the credibility enhancing devices, in 
which case a subset of them may be used.  All that matters is that the sanction be high enough to deter the 
conduct. 
96 See Shavell, supra note 87, at 1241-42. 
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cannot be deterred will nevertheless be prohibited.  Furthermore, to the extent the parties 
use credibility enhancing devices such as hard law, dispute resolution, and monitoring, 
these devices will increase the reputational sanctions imposed when conduct that cannot 
be deterred takes place.   
In the world of imperfect agreements, then, greater use of costly credibility 
enhancing devices generates two main effects.  First, it increases compliance, which 
generates benefits for the parties.  Second, it leads to the use of costly sanctions when an 
obligation is violated – an outcome that imposes losses on the parties.  When deciding 
whether or not to use credibility enhancing devices, then, states must consider this basic 
trade-off between the benefits of increased compliance and the costs of reputational 
sanctions. 
For our purposes, the most important implication of this trade-off is that the 
presence of costly sanctions discourages the use of credibility enhancing devices, at least 
when compared to the case of costless sanctions, such as money damages.  By choosing a 
hard law form, for example, the parties to an agreement generate benefits in the form of 
increased compliance and costs in the form of imposition of the costly sanction.  If the costs 
are larger than the benefits, of course, states will resist the hard law form. 
 
97 The fact that safeguards are, according to many experts, always or almost always inefficient need 
not concern us because what we call the objectives of states is in fact that goals of decision makers within the 
states.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
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D. A Numerical Example 
The above discussion is somewhat abstract, so the following numerical example is 
provided to illustrate the main argument regarding the choice of design elements.  To keep 
the example simple, only one design element – dispute resolution procedures – is 
considered.  The analysis of the other design elements discussed in the paper would be 
identical. 
Assume that there are two countries, labeled A and B.  They face a prisoner’s 
dilemma, which they are attempting to resolve through an international agreement.  For 
concreteness, imagine that the agreement imposes obligations on each party with respect to 
domestic environmental policies.    The question at hand is not whether or not the states 
should enter into the agreement, but whether the agreement should include a dispute 
resolution provision.
98 
Assume that if both parties comply with the terms of the agreement, they each 
receive a payoff of 5.
99  If one or both of the parties violate the agreement, the payoffs are 
affected by the presence or absence of a dispute resolution clause.  If there is no such clause 
and both parties violate their commitments, they each earn zero.  If one party violates the 
agreement while the other complies, the complying party faces a loss of 5 while the party 
that violates the agreement receives a positive payoff.  These payoffs reflect the fact that 
 
98 For simplicity we assume that the parties are choosing whether or not to include an established set 
of dispute resolution provisions.  In reality, of course, states may be able to construct any number of different 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  The example captures this wider set of options if one imagines the states 
choosing between any pair of approaches to the question of dispute resolution. 
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the violating party avoids the costs of domestic changes but may still get the benefit of 
compliance by its counter-party.  The complying party, on the other hand, makes costly 
changes to its domestic regime but does not get the expected benefit of compliance by the 
other state. 
This size of the payoff received by the breaching party is a random variable, labeled 
N.  The range of possible values of N is such that the agreement will be breached in some 
cases, but not in others.
100  In the absence of a dispute resolution clause, then, the game 
can be represented as follows: 
  Country B 
  Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate  (5, 5)  (-5, N) 
Country A 
Defect  (N, -5)  (0, 0) 
If the states include a dispute resolution clause, a breached against party can bring 
the breaching party before a neutral tribunal which has the authority to declare that the 
state is in violation of the agreement.
101  The presence of this dispute resolution procedure 
increases the likelihood of compliance because a state that loses before the tribunal suffers 
 
99 The game as presented should be thought of as the present discounted value of a repeated game 
rather than a one shot game.  This is important because the game must be repeated for cooperation to emerge 
as a possibility in the absence of an enforcement mechanism.  
100 This variable could represent any number of factors exogenous to the discussion, including 
economic shocks, domestic political developments, international events, and so on. 
101 One could imagine stronger dispute resolution provisions, for example the tribunal could be 
authorized to impose some form of sanction.  All that matters for present purposes is that the dispute 
resolution provisions work to increase the costs of a violation. 
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a reputational loss.
102  The loss comes about because the state that loses before a tribunal 
finds it more difficult to establish international agreements in later periods with either its 
counter party in this agreement or third parties.
103  Assume that this reputational loss 
imposes a cost of 2 on a state. 
If the parties adopt the dispute resolution clause described above, the game can be 
represented as follows: 
 Country  B 
  Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate  (5, 5)  (-5, N-2) 
Country A
Defect (N-2,-5)  (-2,  -2) 
Finally, assume that the probability of compliance in the absence of a dispute 
resolution procedure is 50%, and the addition of such a procedure increases that probability 
to 60%.  Now consider whether the states prefer to include a dispute resolution mechanism 
or not when they negotiate the agreement.  If they conclude the agreement without 
providing for dispute resolution, they each expect to earn 5 with 50% probability (i.e., if 
there is compliance), generating an expected payoff of 2.5.
104 
102 See Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 14. 
103 Without a dispute resolution clause, it is assumed for simplicity that there is no reputational loss 
in the event of a violation.  It is straightforward to incorporate a positive reputational loss even in the absence 
of a dispute resolution clause. 
104 By assuming that the variable N is the same for both states we ensure that if one violates the 
agreement the other one does as well.  This assumption is not necessary for the results. 
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If instead they provide for dispute resolution, they expect to earn 5 with 60% 
probability and lose 2 with 40% probability, yielding an expected payoff of 2.2 (3-0.8).  
Thus, even taking into account the increased compliance generated by the dispute 
resolution clause, the parties are better off without such a clause.  This is so because when 
there is a violation, a net cost is imposed on the parties (meaning that one suffers a loss 
that is not offset by the other’s gain).  In this example, the benefits of increased compliance 
are outweighed by that loss. 
With a small change in the assumptions, one can generate the opposite result.   
Assume that everything remains the same except the dispute resolution clause increases 
the probability of compliance to 70% rather than 60% as previously assumed.  In that case, 
the parties still expect to receive 2.5 if they do not have dispute resolution, but if they 
provide for dispute resolution, they can expect to enjoy a gain of 5 with 70% probability 
and a loss of 2 with 30% probability, yielding a net expected gain of 2.9 (5*0.7 – 2*0.3).  
With this modified set of assumptions, a dispute resolution clause is beneficial to the 
parties. 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward.  A dispute settlement clause is 
attractive because it increases the likelihood of compliance and, therefore, the probability 
of the cooperative outcome.  As the impact of dispute resolution on compliance increases, 
so does the use of dispute resolution clauses.  On the other hand, even in the presence of a 
dispute resolution clause, breach will sometimes occur.  Because the reputational loss is a 
net loss to the parties rather than a transfer between them, increasing that loss reduces the 
payoff to the parties in those states of the world in which there is a breach.   
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When negotiating an agreement, therefore, the parties must take into account both 
the increase in compliance that is generated by the dispute resolution clause and the 
resulting joint loss that occurs when there is a breach.  These offsetting effects will lead 
them to include dispute resolution provisions in some agreements but not in others.   
E. Public Choice 
The above discussion has proceeded on the assumption that injuries to one state 
that take the form of reputational losses or direct sanctions represent a net loss to the 
parties – that is, the harm to the violating party is not offset by a gain to the other party.  
That assumption may be problematic if a particular form of political economy is at work in 
the sanctioning state. 
When direct sanctions are applied, it is at least conceivable that the political 
leaders applying those sanctions may benefit.  Thus, for example, if a government imposes 
sanctions in retaliation for what is perceived to be a violation of the trade obligations of 
another state, this may enhance the political support of the government, despite the fact 
that it harms the citizens of the sanctioning state. 
To the extent that sanctions generate benefits to the sanctioning party, their 
influence resembles that of transfers.  That is, the loss to one party is at least partially offset 
by benefits to the other party.  Where this is true, the parties have a reduced incentive to 
avoid the use of sanctions because they are able to get the compliance benefits of the 
sanctions with a lower cost in the event of a violation.  If this is the case, the design 
elements of interest in this Article – hard law, dispute settlement mechanisms, and 
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monitoring – are less costly to include in the agreement.  Notice that if the political 
economy works in the way described here, it is even more surprising that credibility-
enhancing devices are not used more often.  Once we recognize the relevance of public 
choice it is clear that the predictions of the theory,
105 are sensitive to such issues.  Thus, for 
example, areas in which political leaders enjoy benefits when they impose a sanction (trade 
agreements, perhaps) are more likely to feature credibility enhancing devices. 
F. The Interaction of Design Elements and Substantive Provisions 
The design elements discussed in this Article are procedural or structural aspects of 
agreements.  The Article intentionally limits the discussion to a small number of procedural 
issues because their use can be observed directly in an agreement, and because the 
observed practice of states seems especially surprising.  It is hard to say, a priori, what 
substantive obligations one would expect to find in an agreement.  The substantive terms 
are the product of bargaining between the states and the positions of the states are the 
product of a complex domestic political dynamic.  On the procedural side, however, the 
case for an efficient design is much more compelling, as previously discussed.
106 
The same theory, however, could be applied to any aspect of an agreement that 
increases the commitment of the parties but impose a net loss on the parties in the event of 
a violation.  This includes both other procedural provisions of agreements and substantive 
provisions. 
 
105 See Part IV. 
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Like the elements already discussed, the substance of international agreements 
varies widely from one agreement to another.  By substance I refer not to the particular 
topic or subject matter of an agreement, but rather to what is sometimes referred to as 
“depth.”
107  Depth can be defined as “the extent to which [an agreement] requires states to 
depart from what they would have done in its absence.”
108  The notion of depth is intended 
to capture the fact that some agreements place a considerable burden on states and 
demand significant changes in behavior, while other agreements do little more than 
“codify” what states are already doing.
109 
There are obviously many other ways in which the substance of an agreement may 
vary, but this Article restricts itself to a discussion of depth.  It might be argued that the 
notion of depth is itself unsatisfactory because it requires speculation about a counter-
factual set of actions, because it is impossible to quantify, and because a single agreement 
may demand large changes in some states and virtually no changes in others.
110  Without 
resisting any of these critiques, the concept is useful for our purposes, which are limited to a 
discussion of the fact that the depth of an agreement between states may diverge from what 
the states would choose but for the fact that sanctions are costly.
111 
106 See supra Part II.A. 
107 See George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News about Compliance 
Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996); Form and Substance, supra note 9, at *7. 
108 See Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, supra note 108, at 383. 
109 See Form and Substance, supra note 9, at *7. 
110 For example, the TRIPs Agreement required substantial changes to the law of intellectual 
property in many states, including most developing countries, but was largely consistent with the existing 
regimes in the United States and Europe. 
111 A clear example of how the theory presented here might impact the substance of an agreement is 
the common use of escape clauses.  An escape clause allows the parties to an agreement to suspend their 
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As with the design elements that are the main focus of this Article, states are free to 
adopt whatever substantive provisions they wish.  Under a traditional model of contracting, 
one would expect them to select terms that maximize the value of the agreement.  Such 
terms generate an efficient contract when combined with efficient penalties in the event of 
default.  Unlike the design elements discussed in the Article, however, there is no simple 
way to observe the relationship between the chosen terms of an agreement and the efficient 
terms. 
The theory advanced in this Article, however, suggests that states may select 
substantive terms that are systematically weaker than those that would maximize the 
benefits to the states if a costless (i.e., zero-sum) system of damages were available.  To see 
why this is so, consider a simple example.  Suppose that the United States and India wish 
to enter into an agreement that will facilitate the practice of using Indian residents as 
telephone support for the U.S.-based customers of American firms.  The American 
 
compliance if certain conditions are satisfied.  For example, article XIX of the GATT and the WTO’s 
Agreement on Safeguards allow WTO members to suspend their obligation under certain circumstances.  
Like the design elements discussed throughout this Article, the use of escape clauses is influenced by two 
offsetting effects.  First, it reduces the level of commitment of the states in a manner analogous to how the 
omission of a dispute resolution clause reduces the incentive to comply with the terms of the agreement.  The 
safeguards do provide that a member implementing a safeguard is to “maintain a substantially equivalent level 
of concessions.”   Agreement on Safeguards, art. 8(1).  This requirement offsets the impact of the safeguards 
provisions on the level of commitment, but only partially.  The state adopting a safeguard measure is given 
the discretion to determine how to maintain the level of concessions and this discretion obviously reduces the 
extent to which the state is constrained in its actions.  Second, because the escape clause allows a state to 
suspend its commitment, it reduces the sanction for doing so in a manner analogous to the way in which the 
omission of a dispute resolution clause reduces the sanction for a violation.  When drafting an agreement, 
then, states must consider both the reduced likelihood of compliance with the (other) terms of the agreement 
and the reduction in total loss if there is such non-compliance.  There are, of course, other explanations for 
the use of escape clauses and the explanation offered here is intended to be complementary to these earlier 
theories.  See Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard,” 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991); B. Peter 
Rosendorff & Helen Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 
INT’L ORG. 829 (2001). 
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government wants to enter into the agreement to assist its firms in the computer, airline, 
and other industries that rely heavily on telephones for customer service.  India is 
interested in the agreement for the obvious reason that it will provide employment to its 
residents.  Imagine that the states agree on the preferred substantive terms of the 
agreement, which deal with the provision of training programs by India, access for U.S. 
companies to recruitment opportunities, a commitment by the United Stats to underwrite 
some of those programs, and a promise to support and permit American firms to use Indian 
phone operators.  
Having established the value-maximizing terms, the states could incorporate them 
into the agreement, as would be expected if they were private parties negotiating a 
contract.  The states, however, are concerned about the possibility of future violations.  In 
particular, the United States is concerned about criticism from domestic constituencies 
who would prefer that the jobs be in the United States. 
If this were a private contract, the parties would either proceed with the contract 
and include the value maximizing terms or abandon the contract altogether.
112  If they 
proceeded with the contract, they would rely on an efficient sanctions regime to ensure 
that the United States would breach if and only if it were efficient to do so.  In the event of 
such a breach, India would receive damages in compensation. 
 
112 They would proceed with the contract if its total expected value, taking into account the costs 
and benefits incurred by both parties and the risk of a breach, were positive.  
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Because India and the United States are entering into an international agreement, 
however, and because we assume that sanctions are costly,
113 they do not behave like 
private parties.  In particular, they must concern themselves with the fact that if the United 
States violates its commitment under the agreement, the relevant sanction will not be a 
transfer from the U.S. to India.  To keep the example simple, assume that the only sanction 
will be a reputational one, and that the harm to the U.S. from that sanction would be more 
than de minimus.  To the other costs and benefits of the agreement, then, the parties must 
add the cost borne by the United States in the event that it violates the agreement.  This 
reduces the total expected value of the agreement.  If the parties choose a weaker set of 
substantive commitments – perhaps eliminating the American funding of some training 
programs – it is less likely that the United States will violate its commitment, and less likely 
that it will suffer the reputational harm.  In drafting the agreement, then, the parties must 
balance a desire to include the efficient terms against a desire to avoid the consequences of 
a violation.  This may lead them to enter into an agreement with weaker substantive terms. 
The intuition behind this example is easiest to see with some concrete numbers.  
Suppose that the efficient terms yield a total benefit to the countries of 100, but if the 
United States violates its commitment, this imposes an additional loss of 30.
114 
Furthermore, the parties believe that there is a 50% chance that the U.S. will violate its 
commitment.  Entering into the agreement, then, yields an expected benefit of 85.  Now 
 
113 See supra note 15. 
114 Remember that we only care about the joint costs and benefits.  The parties seek to maximize the 
joint value of the agreement and then distribute that value between them as they wish. 
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suppose that the parties could enter into a watered-down version of the agreement that 
would yield 95 in benefits (ignoring the reputational costs of violation), but reduce the risk 
of a U.S. violation to 10%.  This yields an expected benefit of 92.  The states, therefore, 
will select the weaker substantive terms because they yield a higher total expected payoff, 
despite the fact that they are not the efficient terms.
115 
IV. PREDICTIONS OF THE THEORY 
This paper explains that state reluctance to use credibility-enhancing devices is the 
consequence of the fact that sanctions for violations of international law are costly.  The 
theory also generates some predictions about when one would expect more or less use of 
credibility enhancing devices. 
A. Bilateral v. Multilateral Agreements 
The non-zero-sum nature of sanctions in the international arena is a fundamental 
difference between international agreements and private contracts, and drives the main 
results of this paper.  When a state violates a commitment it suffers a reputational loss for 
which there is no offsetting gain to its counter-party.  The reputational sanction, however, 
is not a pure loss.  Other states get a benefit in the form of improved information about the 
reputation of the violating state.  The more these informational benefits are internalized by 
the parties to the transaction the more attractive are credibility-enhancing devices. 
 
115 None of this is to suggest that the theory advanced herein is the only, or even the dominant, 
determinant of the substantive content of an agreement.  The more modest point is that the theory impacts 
on the substance of international agreements. 
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In many bilateral contexts it is reasonable to ignore these informational benefits 
because the bulk of them go to states that are not party to the agreement.  The non-
violating state gains on a small fraction of the informational benefits.  In a multilateral 
agreement, however, more of the informational benefits are captured by parties to the 
agreement.  This reduces the cost of a credibility-enhancing device in the event of a 
violation.  In the extreme, a universal organization would capture all of the informational 
benefits that result from a violation.  In that case it seems likely that the sanctions, rather 
than being negative-sum as they are in most bilateral cases, would be zero-sum or perhaps 
even positive-sum.  The notion here is that the violation allows states to form a more 
accurate view of the violating state’s willingness to comply with commitments, which is 
valuable.  Following a violation, then, states as a group have better information as they 
seek cooperative arrangements.  Though the effect on the violating state is negative, it is 
reasonable to expect that better information yields a net benefit to all states.
116  The ability 
to capture the informational benefits of a violation offers an explanation for why 
agreements with near-universal membership, such as the WTO, sometimes have a formal 
treaty structure and dispute resolution.   
More generally, the more the parties to an agreement are able to internalize the 
informational benefits that flow from a violation, the less costly are credibility-enhancing 
devices.  Thus, an agreement whose parties have a great deal of dealings with one another 
and relatively few dealings with non-parties will capture a large share of the informational 
 
116 See Cost of Credibility, supra note 7, at 319-20 (explaining why it is not certain that the net effect 
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benefits.  This might explain, for example, why regional agreements such as NAFTA or 
some regional human rights agreements (e.g., The Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights) take the form of formal treaties and provide for dispute resolution. 
B. High Stakes v. Low Stakes Agreements 
The benefits of use of credibility-enhancing devices are felt in those states of the 
world in which there would not be compliance but for these devices.  If this set of cases is 
larger the incentive to adopt such devices obviously increases.  More specifically, where the 
compliance decision of states is likely to be influenced by reputational issues the use of 
credibility enhancing devices is more likely.  Where reputation is unlikely to affect 
decisions, these devices will be used less often.  Put another way, credibility-enhancing 
devices are more likely to be used when the marginal impact of such devices on compliance 
is larger. 
One implication of this relationship between reputation and compliance is that 
“high-stakes” agreements, such as those that concern national security or arms control, 
tend not to provide for dispute resolution provisions.  Reputation is limited in its ability to 
impose costs on states and as the stakes increase, the likelihood that reputation will tip the 
balance falls.  For very high stakes issues, then, dispute resolution offers very modest 
compliance benefits.
117 
will be an increase in welfare). 
117 High-stakes agreements are frequently, though certainly not always, formal treaties.  Though this 
is contrary to what the theory suggests, the domestic reasons to prefer a treaty seem likely to offer an 
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High stakes agreements may use monitoring provisions, but this is explained by the 
fact that these provisions do more than simply impose reputational costs in the event of a 
violation.  They also turn high stakes agreements into low stakes commitments.   
Monitoring makes it more likely that a violation will be observed shortly after it occurs.  
This reduces the expected benefits from a violation since it reduces the time period during 
which its counter-party continues to comply.  In this sense, monitoring can serve to change 
a high-stakes agreement into a low-stakes one.  Imagine, for example, an arms control 
agreement which requires the members to limit the number of nuclear missiles they have in 
their possession.  If a monitoring arrangement makes it impossible to exceed the agreed 
upon number by more than a small amount without being detected, the gains from 
violation are reduced.  A decision to violate the agreement, then, would offer only modest 
advantages over a decision to withdraw from the agreement because the state’s counter-
party would observe the violation before any large-scale violation and would react by 
demanding compliance or by terminating its own compliance. 
C. High Compliance v. Low Compliance 
The costs of credibility-enhancing devices are only felt when an international 
obligation is violated.  It follows that these devices are more attractive, all else equal, when 
the probability of a violation is small.  Imagine, for example, an agreement that the parties 
recognize is very likely to be violated, even if credibility-enhancing devices are used.  This 
 
explanation.  The desire of the executive branch to bind domestic actors (e.g., Congress) as much as possible 
seems a likely explanation of the treaty form.  
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means that the expected reputational loss is relatively large.  For any given increase in 
compliance, therefore, the devices less attractive.  Thus, parties entering an agreement that 
they expect to yield a high level of compliance are more likely to find credibility-enhancing 
devices worthwhile than parties entering into an agreement where expected compliance is 
low. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY 
The main purpose of this Article is to explain why states are reluctant to use 
credibility enhancing tools such as hard law, dispute resolution mechanisms, and 
monitoring.  The explanation provided, however, has implications for a range of questions 
related to international agreements.  This section highlights of few of these implications.  It 
is neither an exhaustive cataloging of implications nor a complete discussion of the ones 
mentioned.  Rather, it simply identifies some of the consequences of the theoretical 
argument made in the Article.  
A. The Interpretation of International Agreements 
Each of the design elements discussed offers negotiators a tool to modulate the level 
of credibility and the probability of compliance, but increased compliance comes at the cost 
of a loss to the parties in the event of a violation.  Because the design elements all feature 
this trade-off they are, to some degree, substitutes.  For example, the decision to include a 
dispute resolution mechanism may generate compliance incentives the resemble those of a 
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monitoring system, and one may be chosen over the other because of their respective 
impacts if one party violates the agreement. 
Recognizing the interdependence of the various elements of treaty design sheds 
light on how one should interpret and evaluate international agreements.  The simple 
lesson for drawing normative judgments about agreements is that one cannot evaluate or 
interpret a treaty by looking at a single design element.  If interpretation is to be based on 
the intent of the parties, it must take into account all aspects of design.  To see this, 
consider the example of the International Labor Organization (ILO) Declaration on 
Fundamental Labor Rights, which imposes a set of international labor standards.
118  The 
Fundamental Declaration is binding on all member states of the ILO, and has become a 
focal point in the discussion of international labor rights.  It is particularly important in the 
debate about the proper relationship between trade and labor.  Among the arguments in 
this debate is the claim that trade sanctions are necessary to enforce the rights laid out in 
the Fundamental Declaration because no other effective mechanism exists. 
The claim that no other effective enforcement strategy exists is quite possibly 
correct.  The ILO itself provides no enforcement mechanism beyond some monitoring 
procedures,
119 and unilateral strategies of enforcement such as boycotts, military 
 
118 These standards include: 
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; 
the effective abolition of child labour; and 
the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, International Labor Conference, 
art. 2,  86
th Session, Geneva, June 1998 [hereinafter ILO Declaration].  
119 See Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 213, 222 (2002).   
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intervention, diplomatic protests, social labeling, and so on, either lack credibility or good 
evidence that they influence state behavior.
120  For present purposes, then, assume that 
trade is the only available tool and that threats of trade sanctions are, in fact, effective.
121 
The question for trade and labor, then, is whether states should be permitted to 
impose trade sanctions on states that violate the ILO Declaration.
122  This is, of course, a 
 
120  See Michael J. Trebilcock, Trade Policy and Labour Standards: Objectives, Instruments and 
Institutions (University of Toronto Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 02-01, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN<uscore>ID307219<uscore>code020501530.pdf?abstractid
=307219, at *16-18; Janelle Diller, A Social Conscience in the Global Marketplace? Labour Dimensions of Codes 
of Conduct, Social Labeling and Investor Initiatives, 138 INT’L LABOR REV. 99 (1999); Adelle Blackett, Global 
Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentralized State: A Labour Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8
IND. J. GLOBAL  LEGAL  STUDIES 401 (2001); See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the 
Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 159-61 (1999).  Compensation-based 
strategies involve the making of some form of payment to states that achieve a positive change in their 
practices.  They are criticized both because they involve the dubious practice of compensating states that 
have tolerated the worst labor practices, and because they generate perverse incentives.  Compensation for 
improvement that is not accompanied by a scheme for penalizing a deterioration in those same standards 
generates an incentive for states to lower their standards so they can subsequently be improved and the state 
can capture the payment.  Howard F. Chang, Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 
2131 (1995).   
The effectiveness of social labeling – the placing of a label on products that are produced by workers 
able to exercise their core labor rights – is also subject to significant limitations.  The primary weakness of 
labeling is the voluntary nature of compliance and the lack of enforcement mechanisms.  See Heidi S. 
Bloomfield, “Sweating” the International Garment Industry: A Critique of the Presidential Task Force’s Workplace 
Codes of Conduct and Monitoring System, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 567 (1999) (discussing more 
generally problems of enforcement and monitoring in voluntary codes of conduct for multilateral 
corporations); Alicia Morris Groos, International Trade and Development: Exploring the Impact of Fair Trade 
Organizations in the Global Economy and the Law, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 379, 408 (“WTO rules mandate that 
goods cannot be subject to statutory labeling requirements or differentiated on the basis of how they are 
produced”).  To the extent that enforcement stems from consumer preferences, social labeling also suffers 
from a collective action problem.  The individual consumer has an incentive to purchase lower priced goods 
produced under poor labor conditions, relying on other consumers to bear the cost of the higher priced goods 
produced under core labor standards.  See Trebilcock, supra note 120; Katherina Van Wezel, To the Yukon 
and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERG. BUS. L. 93 (1999); Anjli Garg, Child 
Labor Social Clause: Analysis and Proposal for Action, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 473, 504-05.   
121 There is actually serious debate about whether trade sanctions are an effective tool to influence 
labor policies.  The most important empirical evidence on the question is in GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (2d ed. 1990).  This work is at times 
cited in support of claims that sanctions often fail.  See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human 
Rights: An Economic Perspective, * 16-17 (mimeo 2002) (on file with author); Howse, supra note 120, at 158-
62. 
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complex question and a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
123  For present 
purposes it is only necessary to consider if the absence of effective enforcement other than 
trade advances the case for such trade sanctions.  The lesson from this Article is that, far 
from supporting a claim for a trade exception, the ILO’s failure to adopt enforcement 
procedures or other sanctions should be viewed as evidence that no such exception should 
be created.  Though states simply agreed to the substantive provisions of the Fundamental 
Declaration, they only did so within the context of the Declaration and the ILO and the 
associated enforcement mechanisms.  The fact that the agreement does not feature dispute 
resolution procedures and sanctions should be viewed as an international choice made by 
the parties; not as an unfortunate oversight that can be corrected by subjecting the 
Fundamental Declaration’s substantive rules to the WTO’s dispute settlement process.
124 
There is simply no reason to infer from the existence of the Fundamental Declaration that 
states consented to comply with its provisions in any environment except the one 
 
122 It is assumed that the WTO does not already provide an exception of this sort.  This is the 
dominant view, but it is challenged by some scholars.  See Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human 
Rights in a Global Economy (February 20, 2002), 
http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/wtoRightsGlob.html; Howse, Protection of 
Workers’ Rights, supra note 120. 
123 I have expressed my views on the subject elsewhere.  See Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, 
Legitimacy, forthcoming, CALIF. L. REV. (2003).  The key articles in the trade and labor include Alan O. 
Sykes, International Trade and Human rights: An Economic Perspective, World Trade Forum 2001; Michael 
J. Trebilcock, Trade Policy and Labour Standards, Michael J. Trebilcock, Trade Policy and Labour Standards: 
Objectives, Instruments and Institutions, University of Toronto Law and Economics Working Paper No. 02-
01 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labor Standards on the World Trading System: 
An Historical Overview, 126 INT’L LABOR REV. 565 (1987); Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting 
Human Rights in a Global Economy (February 20, 2002), 
http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/wtoRightsGlob.html; Virginia Leary, 
Workers’ Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, (Jagdish 
Bhagwati and Robert Hudec, eds., 1996); Brian Langille, Eight Ways to Think About International Labour 
Standards, 31 J. World Trade 27 (1997); Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection 
of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERG. BUS. L. 131 (1999).  
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established by the ILO.  In particular, there is no evidence that they would have consented 
to the substantive provisions if they faced trade sanctions in the event of a violation or if 
their behavior was subject to dispute resolution procedures. 
The general lesson, then, is that states enter into agreements, including the 
enforcement mechanisms, intentionally and attempt to design those agreements in such a 
way as to maximize their value.  If enforcement mechanisms were omitted it should be 
presumed that this was done because the states did not feel the compliance benefits of 
those mechanisms were large enough to justify the costs that would be imposed in the 
event of a violation. 
B. Damages and International Law 
The basic puzzle of why states do not increase the credibility of their commitments 
has been explained in this Article by the fact that in the event of a violation the parties to 
an agreement suffer a net loss rather than simply a transfer from one party to the other.  As 
a result, states may fail to enter into what would be value-maximizing agreements if zero-
sum transfers were available.   
In other words, if it were possible to eliminate the loss to the parties that results 
from a violation and, instead, have damages take the form of a zero-sum transfer from one 
party to the other, more efficient forms of cooperation would be possible.
125  Even though 
 
124 See Fundamental Declaration. 
125 This is part of the reason why a credible threat to withdraw one’s own compliance can serve as an 
effective mechanism to induce compliance.  When compliance is costly for the complying state but yields 
benefits for a counter-party, the withdrawal of compliance in response to a violation is a form of transfer – the 
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reputational and direct sanctions could not be eliminated, the presence of transfers would 
reduce their importance by increasing the credibility of and compliance with international 
agreements without adding to the disincentive that the former sanctions generate. 
The ideal form of damages would, of course, be money damages.  These represent 
pure transfers from one state to the other, can be made in any amount, and payment is 
easily verifiable.  Despite these advantages, states appear reluctant to call for the use of 
money damages in their agreements.  I do not have a complete explanation for why they 
are so resistant,
126 and am aware of no compelling theory on the subject, but the observed 
resistance to money damages cannot be ignored.
127 
Despite this resistance, however, there are at least some instances where states have 
accepted the use of money damages, suggesting that they might be encouraged to do so 
more often.  Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), for example, typically provide for the 
payment of money damages from states to private parties whose investment has been 
 
sanctioning state is better off because it no longer bears the costs of compliance, and the other state is worse 
off because it no longer receives the benefits.  Though this is more indirect than a cash transfer, and there is 
no guarantee that the impact will be zero-sum, it can often enhance credibility without causing a net loss in 
the event of a violation.  This may also explain why states normally accept this credibility-enhancing device -- 
which they could opt-out of through the language of their agreement -- when they are less likely to include, 
for example, dispute resolution provisions. 
126 I offer here two possible reasons why money damages may be unpopular.  These are merely 
suggestive, I am not confident that either is an important part of the explanation for the resistance to money 
damages.  States may avoid money damages because it serves as an ineffective incentive device for states.  
Because damages could be paid out of general revenues, the political costs of having to pay a fine may be 
small.  Alternatively, it might be that there are significant political costs to paying an award mandated by an 
international body.  Indeed, there may even be political costs to receiving such an award.  Imagine, for 
example, an agreement between two states regarding environmental issues.  There may be political resistance 
to the notion that one’s counter-party can violate and simply pay damages.  Accepting the award as full 
compensation may be politically costly for government. 
127 See Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, 77 INT’L AFF. 15 (2001). 
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expropriated.
128  Similarly, some human rights agreements include dispute resolution and a 
requirement of compensation to the victims of human rights abuses.
129  Within the EU the 
Court of Justice has the authority, under certain circumstances, to impose a monetary 
penalty on a member state.
130  Given the benefits of money damages, states should consider 
adopting at least some form of monetary sanction for other violations.  The easiest to 
imagine are those with relatively direct financial effects such as injury resulting from 
violations of trade obligations.  In at least some cases –think, for example, of an illegal anti-
dumping measure – the harm is almost purely economic and could be estimated with 
reasonable accuracy.  In at least these cases the use of money damages may be palatable 
because the harm is closely tied to economic harms. 
C. The Role of Soft Law 
This Article advances a new explanation for why states choose soft law when they 
could choose to make their commitments through treaties.  The merit of a treaty is that it 
provides a relatively high level of commitment – allowing a state to rely on the promises 
made by its treaty partner.  In other words, the commitment is more credible.  The 
credibility provided by a treaty, however, comes at a price in the form of a higher cost 
associated with breach.  When deciding between a treaty and other forms of commitment, 
then, the parties take that loss into account.   
 
128 Guzman, supra note 85; Vandevelde, supra note 26. 
129 See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 9(5) (“Anyone 
who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”). 
130 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 228(2). 
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There is considerable confusion and ambiguity in how international law views soft 
law.  This is, in part, due to the fact that commentators have tried to reconcile soft law 
with classical definitions of international law, which do not mention this form of 
agreement.  This doctrinal approach is awkward because it implies that soft law is not law 
at all, leaving little room for discussion among legal scholars.  A more promising approach 
starts with the question of how international agreements of all kind affect the incentives 
and behavior of states.  In this sense, we begin with an eye toward compliance issues.
131 
Although one can find discussions of compliance in both the legal and international 
relations literature,
132 I are unaware of any well developed attempt to address soft law in 
this way.
133 
The discussion in this Article suggests that soft law is simply another form of legal 
promise.  Like a decision to exclude dispute resolution provisions, soft law represents a 
choice by the parties to enter into a weaker form of commitment.  Just as the absence of 
dispute resolution does not imply that an agreement is not “law,” the decision to use soft 
law should not exclude the agreement from study or somehow render it less relevant.   
 
131 I have written on compliance issues in the past.  See A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 14. 
132 See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 46-48 (1979); Abram Chayes & Antonia Chayes, On 
Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 176 (1993); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1995); Koh, supra note 10; Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 34; Keohane, supra note 34, at 
25 . 
133 See Steven R. Ratner, Does International Law Matter In Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32 N.Y.U.J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 591, 654 (2000). But see INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith 
Brown Weiss ed., 1997); COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE  ROLE OF NON-BINDING  NORMS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton, ed. 2000) (analyzing “soft law” in environment and natural 
resources, trade and finance, human rights, and multilateral arms control). 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art13Design of International Agreements 
1740-text.native.1082650451 
4/22/2004 9:13 AM 
56
Rather than focus on doctrinal questions of what is soft or hard law, scholars should 
recognize that states design their agreements to lie at a particular point on a spectrum of 
credibility and effectiveness.  In doing so, they are trading off the credibility of their 
commitments against the cost of a violation.  Ultimately, then, the study of international 
law should treat soft law in much the same way it should treat treaties – as a device that 
promotes international cooperation.  The differences between treaties and soft law – for 
example, the significant differences in their domestic effect – should be taken into account, 
but both should be considered legal commitments with the potential to affect behavior. 
In addition, soft law should not be viewed as a “second-best” outcome.
134  The fact 
that states have reached an agreement does not imply that it in some sense should be a 
treaty.  States may prefer to enter into soft law agreements as a way of maximizing their 
joint benefits, and there is no a priori reason why this should be viewed as a less desirable 
form of cooperation. 
D. Designing Agreements 
This Article explains why states enter into agreements that contain quite limited 
enforcement mechanisms.  This need not mean that they are disingenuous about the 
commitment being made.  It may instead mean that they are reluctant to accept the joint 
loss that would be triggered by a violation.  This point has implications for the way in 
which we view agreements and the ways in which agreements should be structured.  The 
 
134 See Oscar Schacter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT’L
L. (1977) (“nonbonding agreements may be attainable when binding treaties are not”). 
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importance of using damages or some other sort of transfer has already been discussed, and 
as pointed out there, a system of damages would go a long way toward overcoming state 
resistance to more credible or binding commitments.
135 
If damages are not available, however, other strategies must be considered.  One 
lesson from this Article is that states should not be discouraged from entering into 
agreements that appear weak and fail to make use of available design elements to increase 
the incentives toward compliance.  It is possible that such agreements represent the highest 
value form of cooperation for the states involved, and it should therefore be pursued.
136 
VI. CONCLUSION 
International agreements are at the foundation of international cooperation and 
international law.  Yet we have no more than a crude understanding of why states structure 
agreements as they do.  This Article explains why states are not more enthusiastic about 
including credibility enhancing devices in their agreements.  The paper has explicitly 
addressed the choice of soft versus hard law, the inclusion or exclusion of dispute 
settlement, and the provision or omission of monitoring mechanisms, but the same 
 
135 See supra Part V.B. 
136 The major caveat to this conclusion relates to the public choice issues that are always present in 
international relations.  Depending on one’s public choice assumptions, it may be unwise to give negotiators 
the ability to enter into agreements that do not include rigorous obligations and enforcement strategies.  For 
example, if one believes that those who negotiate agreements have a strong incentive to achieve some 
concrete agreement, even when the substantive impact of the agreement is virtually nil, then it may be 
desirable to impose discipline on negotiators by forcing them to choose between truly effective agreements 
and no agreement at all.  See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 957, 
961 (2002) (“[T]he people who negotiate international agreements, as well as the people who serve the 
institutions that promote these negotiations, have powerful incentives to achieve some kind of agreement 
regardless of substantive outcome.”). 
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reasoning could apply to any credibility enhancing strategy that improves the probability of 
compliance but also increases the joint loss in the event of a violation. 
The insight of this Article represents only a small piece of the larger set of questions 
such as: Why do states behave the way they do? How do international agreements affect 
behavior? When will international law succeed and when will it fail to constrain states? 
What institutional strategies might be used to increase the power of international law?  
Though much more work remains to be done on all of these questions, this Article has 
lessons for they way in which we view agreements.  It is clear, for example, that the 
commitments made by a state in an international agreement should be viewed as a single 
undertaking that includes not only the substantive commitments, but also the procedural 
elements of the agreement.  It is also apparent that mechanisms to allow for zero-sum 
sanctions in the event of a violation should be investigated and pursued.  This Article 
mentions the advantages of money damages, but other forms of sanction may exist that 
would increase the credibility of commitments without reducing the total benefits of the 
agreement in the event of a violation.  More generally, further research is called for on a 
wide range of questions that relate to international agreements and the ways in which 
states make commitments.  These are fundamental questions for international law whose 
answers will greatly increase our understanding of the discipline. 
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